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INTRODUCTION
Class actions regulate when government fails. Perhaps their use as
an alternative regulatory scheme explains the fervor and rhetoric
surrounding Rule 23's political life.' In truth, corporate officers and
* Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law. I am grateful to Richard Nagareda,
Howard Erichson, Dean John L. Carroll, Brannon Denning, Scott Dodson, Marcia McCormick,
Belle Stoddard, Dr. Peggy Torrey, and Thomas Burch for their comments on earlier drafts.
I See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49 (2002); H.R. REP. 107-370, at 6 (2002).
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directors agonize less over the Securities Exchange Commission than
over potential securities fraud class actions;2 pharmaceutical companies
worry less about the Federal Drug Administration's post-approval
monitoring than about products liability class actions;3 and the Federal
Trade Commission is less threatening to companies apt to ignore fair
credit reporting requirements than the class action bar.4
Inherent in these observations is the idea that the class action does
more than aggregate claims; it augments government policing and
generates external societal benefits. These societal benefits-
"extemalities"--are the spillover effects from facilitating small claims
litigation. In federalizing class actions through the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), 5 Congress, in some ways, impeded class action
practice and thereby affected its positive spillovers. This Article
critically considers CAFA's effect on class litigation as ex post
regulation that enhances the common good. 6 It also develops an
implicit, but overlooked, theme within the CAFA debate-the notion
that litigation itself is a public good.
A "public good" is typically defined as one that the government
must provide because there are insufficient market incentives for private
participants to do so. 7 Embedded in this concept is the collective action
problem: there is no market incentive to provide a good that benefits
2 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities
Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 894 (2005) ("So
robust is the securities class action that with great confidence the attorney can advise her client
that one is far more likely to encounter the plaintiffs' securities class action lawyer than SEC
enforcement personnel.").
3 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 384
(2007) ("Not only is ex ante regulation by the FDA a decided outlier in American regulatory
practice, but even primary reliance on governmental actors is exceptional outside the criminal
context."); Diana Zuckerman, Editorial, The Bitter Fruits of A Lax FDA: Congress Must Help Get
Unsafe Medial Products Off the Market, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 21, 2007, at 19;
Robert Cohen, FDA Bill Debate Joins GOP, Pharma: Lawmaker Expects Cuts to be Made, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 17, 2007, at 1 ("'It is very clear that there are gaping holes in the
current system and the public has lost a great amount of confidence in FDA's ability to protect
them from potentially harmful drugs,' said Rep. Pallone (D-6th Dist.), the bill's sponsor."); Drug
Thugs, USA TODAY, June 8, 2007, at 14A; Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Remains Unsettled in Wake of
New Questions, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A14.
4 See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006).
5 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6 Conceptions of "public good," like public rationales, tend to incorporate cultural values,
which may resonate in other comprehensive doctrines such as religion, Kantianism, utilitarianism,
virtue-ethics, or the like. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
230-31 (2004). Thus, my conception of "public good" likewise will diverge from a pure
utilitarian perspective although I tend to couch this Article in those familiar phrases.
7 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2623
(1995). For more information on this concept, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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everyone equally. 8 This disincentive has been labeled the problem of
"jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion." 9 Optimally
deterring wrongdoing through litigation is one example of a public
good. Deterrence benefits the public in general and excludes no one.
There is also a collective action problem: would-be litigants with
insubstantial damages may do nothing in hopes of free riding on a
similar previous action's preclusive effects or benefiting from an across-
the-board policy change.' 0
The class action overcomes this collective action conundrum by
pooling claims and allowing plaintiffs' attorneys to collect a fee based
on the entire recovery." The class action thus produces a public good:
litigation. Class litigation is both a public good provider-by deterring
wrongdoing-and a good itself. In fact, pursuing class litigation
produces a laundry list of positive externalities. 12 To start, class
litigation engenders a private cadre of supplemental regulators and
shapes acceptable procedures for processing aggregate claims. It
establishes rules of conduct that both delineate boundaries for
acceptable social behavior and decrease the need for future lawsuits.
Moreover, class litigation creates a viable litigation threat to corporate
actors engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, makes information about
corporate products and practices publicly available, and prompts policy
changes that extend beyond the litigants and to the public. 13 Because
class litigation is a public good that generates these positive spillovers, I
use this concept as a heuristic to evaluate CAFA's derivative effects on
backdoor regulation.
Still, I realize that class actions also cause negative spillovers. It is
true that they are not perfect regulators. There are legitimate and
compelling arguments that certain class actions have caused more harm
than good. I opt here, however, to leave those questions and arguments
for another day. Thus, as a starting point, I take for granted the
following: class actions perform a regulatory function; this function can
have a public benefit; and, to the extent that this function creates more
good than harm, CAFA affects that good.
Part I begins by explaining how the private class action performs
8 William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006); Luban, supra note 7, at 2623
("Economists define a public good as a beneficial product that cannot be provided to one
consumer without making it available to all (or at least many others). The textbook example is a
lighthouse .... ).
9 RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982); Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 711.
10 Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 711.
I The ability to pool small claims through the class action device is a necessary incentive for
inducing private attorneys to file suit and remedy small but broadly suffered harms.
12 See id. at 723-25; Luban, supra note 7, at 2623-26 (identifying development of advocacy
skills as an additional externality).
13 See Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 723-25; Luban, supra note 7, at 2623-26.
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this supplemental regulatory function and highlights the controversial
"private attorney general" concept. Despite divergent views, private
attorney involvement can produce a public good regardless of self-
interested or altruistic motivations. Still, much of the class action
criticism dwells on attorney motivations and miscreant state-court
judges. The argument is this: plaintiffs' attorneys bring class actions
affecting the nation as a whole in state courts where judges are elected
by a few thousand constituents and are willing to certify class actions
with questionable merit. Thus, this Part canvasses a few of the
arguments that convinced Congress to alter the dynamic of ex post
regulation by removing class actions from state to federal court
Part II turns to the question of whether CAFA changes more than
venue. It does. Examining CAFA's impact on the longstanding
substance versus procedure morass and the choice-of-law problem
produces a simple and intuitive result: CAFA results in fewer class
certifications. With this result in mind, I analyze how non-certification
affects procedural justice-first sketching procedural fairness's
principal components and then employing a consequentialist and
deontological critique of post-CAFA regulatory process. Post-CAFA
process creates a procedural justice dilemma: it disproportionately
favors defendants, but this may be justified by pragmatic considerations
of cost and access for litigants. Finally, again bearing in mind that
CAFA leads to non-certification, the last Part considers CAFA's
negation of class litigation's positive externalities. 14 These include
systemic transparency, deterrence, and preclusion.
I. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT OF PRIVATIZING REGULATION
Although class actions spark controversy, no one denies that a
quiet government trend to privatize various regulatory aspects for the
public good has been occurring for awhile now. Class actions are
stowaways within this trend. The trend is premised on the utilitarian
concept of promoting the common good and on a push to minimize
direct government regulation. 15 Take our tort liability system for
example. It incorporates, at least in some respects, the utilitarian
14 To be more precise, I consider CAFA's theoretical impact because most class actions have
not matured through a full litigation cycle since its enactment.
15 See JERRY PAQUETTE, SOCIAL PURPOSE AND SCHOOLING: ALTERNATIVES, AGENDAS AND
ISSUES 8 (1991) (observing that political social purpose agendas often include minimizing
government regulation and buying into the idea that "social and economic Darwinism believed to
provide the greatest good for the greatest number in a market as free as possible"); David 0.
Brink, Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming fall 2007) (manuscript at 59), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-978824.
[Vol. 29:62520
HeinOnline  -- 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2520 2007-2008
CAFA 'S IMPA CT
objective of optimizing public welfare through deterring socially
unacceptable risks. 16 Even social policy debates such as health care and
gun control contain a thematic appeal-whether knowingly or not-to
utilitarian principles. 17
Implicit in these debates is the abstract idea that rights do not
protect themselves. Rather, the government either acts to regulate a
field or, as has increasingly become the case, permits private actors to
fill the void. "Regulation" in the United States is unique in its low
market entry costs and stringent back-end regulation through
litigation. 18 Litigation-heavy ex post regulation across-the-board makes
government funding problematic. Consequently, Congress has passed
statutory incentives, such as attorneys' fees, to promote private
litigation. 19 Moreover, a lack of governmental resources, political
pressures, and federal information gaps about local occurrences on the
one hand, plus public vigilance and entrepreneurial attorneys on the
other, makes decentralized enforcement through private litigation a
viable alternative to costly monitoring of ex ante regulation. 20 Thus
enters the class action.
This use of the private class action bar in decentralized
enforcement, as Richard Stewart indicates, "frees individuals from total
dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies and gives them a
personal role and stake in the administration of justice. It provides a
back-up guarantee of redress."' 21 Similarly, Richard Marcus observes
16 David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 566 (1987).
17 JAMES WOOD BAILEY, UTILITARIANISM, INSTITUTIONS, AND JUSTICE 7-8 (1997).
18 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 4 (2003);
Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 385 ("Ex post accountability is the prerequisite for ex ante
liberalization.").
19 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (providing attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Act); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (providing for the payment of fees in Title VII cases). Ex post
regulation through litigation is somewhat analogous to the prior restraint doctrine in the First
Amendment. As Martin Redish observes, "Under the prior restraint doctrine, the government
may not restrain a particular expression prior to its dissemination even though the same
expression could be constitutionally subjected to punishment after dissemination .... [The
doctrine] assumes that prior restraints are more harmful to free speech interests than are other
forms of regulation ...." Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in
First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1984).
20 See Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 383; William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney
General" Is-and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2149-50 (2004) ("Private attorneys
may be better at [discerning or pursuing private wrongdoing] . . . for a variety of reasons-
because public attorneys may be fewer in number, underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political
pressures."); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 247-48 (2007) ("When so many agencies
are understaffed and unable to enforce existing law, the private right of action is more important
than ever in ensuring that unsafe practices and products are identified and kept out of the market."
(quoting Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky to President George W. Bush (Feb. 16,
2006))).
21 Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
2008] 2521
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that litigation as a private enforcement technique is a natural
outcropping of regulation: "On the positive side, [the American
tendency to litigate] can provide remarkable protections on the initiative
of a few, including the dispossessed; those who champion the remedial
potential of adversary legalism are right." 22 Providing a bit of
background, this section explores how class litigation fulfills this
regulatory need and how performing this function pushed Congress to
enact CAFA.
A. Privatizing Ex Post Enforcement
Private class litigation provides the principal policing function in a
number of areas. 23 For example, the Federal Trade Commission often
takes a backseat view on Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation, preferring
to file amicus briefs on behalf of private class representatives than to
initiate litigation.24 Similarly, political priorities constrain the Securities
Exchange Commission, resulting in enforcement agendas that ignore
certain corporate misdeeds. Even former SEC Commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid recognized the private bar's importance in securities
regulation: "Private enforcement is a necessary supplement to the work
that the [SEC] does. It is also a safety valve against the potential
capture of the agency by industry. '25
Even absent the politics behind selective enforcement and the
"agency capture" notion,26 class actions vindicate substantive law norms
184, 198 (1987).
22 Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901,907 (2002).
23 See generally Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHi. L. REv. 684, 687 (1941) (commenting on the use of private class litigation to
"police large areas of modem law and provide the exclusive remedy for many large-scale group
injuries").
24 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.
2006); Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 722 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) (thanking the Federal
Trade Commission for its arnicus brief); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 4, at 106; cfAm.
Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering an amicus brief filed
by the Federal Trade Commission on behalf of plaintiff bankers' associations in a non-class
enforcement action); Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1057 (9th Cir.
2002) (considering an FTC amicus brief on the plaintiff's behalf in non-class litigation).
25 Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2006, at Al; see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (commenting that
"(p]rivate enforcement [of securities laws].., provides a necessary supplement" to public law
enforcement).
26 See generally Marcy Gordon, SEC Chairman Rebuffs Claim that Agency Tilts Toward Wall
Street, LAW.COM, June 27, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1182848789645 ("The
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission... defended the agency's record in
pursuing corporate misconduct, rebuffing accusations that it may be tilting toward business
interests."). "Agency capture" conveys the idea that a particular agency capitulates to industry
rather than consumer. See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Commentary, A Cure for What Ails the FDA, AM.
[Vol. 29:62522
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despite society's inherent distrust of (and refusal to fund) centralized
government. 27 Shifting enforcement to the private sector has the added
benefit of creating multiple enforcers who "should generate more
innovations than a monopolistic government enforcer would produce. '28
Multiple enforcers boost not only innovation, but also deterrence. 29 By
enabling negative or low value claims that would otherwise be
economically unfeasible, class actions-at least theoretically-deter
wrongdoing. 30
Through fostering accountability, enforcing public norms, and
circumnavigating the possibility that an attorney general could abuse
her discretionary authority, class litigation itself becomes a public
good.31 As Bill Rubenstein explains, "The class action mechanism is
important not just because it enables a group of litigants to conquer a
collective action problem and secure relief, but also-perhaps more
so--because the litigation it engenders produces external benefits for
society. ' 32 Rubenstein labels this litigation-as-a-public-good a "positive
externality" in that it creates value for nonparties even beyond
deterrence. 33 Class actions add value by fostering transparency,
producing settlement guidelines, and creating precedent. They thus
reduce the need for future litigation though decree effects, behavioral
adjustments, stare decisis, and preclusion.34
LAW., June 26, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 182503155456
(observing that FDA critics claim it is more accountable to "Big Pharma" than to the public).
27 Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1931 (2006) [hereinafter Aggregation on the Couch];
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via
Media?, 26 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 385, 387 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class
Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 20,22 (1996) ("This reluctance [to rely on government-initiated
civil suits] may reflect the characteristic American distrust of government power and the desire to
preserve a place for the ingenious and imaginative citizen.").
28 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REv. 185,206.
29 At least theoretically class actions contribute to deterrence. See infra notes 192-205 and
accompanying text.
30 Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 573; see, e.g., Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710,
719-20 (N.J. 2007) ("If each victim were remitted to an individual suit, the remedy could be
illusory, for the individual loss may be too small to warrant a suit or the victim too disadvantaged
to seek relief. Thus the wrongs would go without redress and there would be no deterrence to
further aggressions." (quoting Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 294 A.2d 7, 10 (N.J. 1972)));
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 349-50 (1972); Gilles & Friedman, supra
note 4, at 105; Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict ofInterest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47,73 (1975).
31 See David Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public
Agency Enforcement ofAntitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 172 (2006) ("[O]nly by
enhancing the effectiveness of the class action can private enforcement effectively serve its dual
role in relation to public enforcement: complement and check."); Fiss, supra note 27, at 22.
32 Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 710.
33 Id. at 723; see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure
Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 901 (1984).
34 Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 710.
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Because class litigation performs these semi-public activities, the
class action plaintiffs bar has been labeled "private attorneys
general. ' 35 The most apt depiction of the private attorney general as an
enforcement tool is not as contrasted with the government, i.e., private
attorney general on one hand and the government on the other. Rather,
it is as a fluid mix along a continuum, serving both private and public
functions at various moments. 36 This continuum recognizes that the
private attorney general dynamic is not as clear-cut as "good" attorneys
initiating meritorious cases and "bad" attorneys filing frivolous ones.
But we see this dichotomy unfolding in the media and academic
commentaries. For example, anti-tobacco plaintiffs' attorneys have
been described as a "missionary group" 37 Agent Orange plaintiffs'
lawyers reported their goals in terms pursuing the public good;38 and the
plaintiffs' class action bar as a whole has come to invoke public-
interestedness as standard rhetoric.39 Others view class actions and the
plaintiffs' attorneys who bring them as improperly circumventing
democratic processes. 40 Still others liken plaintiffs' attorneys to
35 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 4, at 110; John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica
Davidson Miller, Class Action "Cops": Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1441, 1451 (2005) (noting the theory that class action lawyers serving as private attorneys
general is appropriate only if attorneys act like and achieve the same results as a true public
servant would); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 218 (1983) ("The conventional
theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of private litigation is not simply to
secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence ...."); Kalven &
Rosenfield, supra note 23, at 715. But see Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 71, 76 ("Where the government wishes to deter or punish unlawful behavior in a more
direct and reliable manner, it has several options available to it. Instead of, or in addition to, the
private compensatory remedy, a legislature may utilize any permutation or combination of a
variety of conceivable remedial models, including criminal enforcement, civil penalties, and
administrative regulation."). According to Professor Yeazell, the notion of a "private attorney
general" originated from Professors Kalven and Rosenfeld's 1941 scholarship. STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 232 (1987)
(citing Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 23, at 721); see also Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorney Generals.").
36 Professor Rubenstein likens the private attorney general concept to Alfred Kinsey's
taxonomy of sexual orientations and points out that "[t]here are not just two pure forms-the
private attorney on the one hand and the government attorney on the other-but rather an array of
mixes of the public and private." Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 2132.
37 See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 22 (1998);
Howard M. Eichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2087, 2098 (2004) (citing an
Interview with Professor Daynard, Director, Tobacco Products Liab. Project in Boston, Mass.
(Apr. 26, 2002)).
38 PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
43 (1986).
39 Erichson, supra note 37, at 2099.
40 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
LIABILITY LAW 4, 14 (Walter Olson ed., 1988); Redish, supra note 35, at 71; Richard A. Epstein,
Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 516-18
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"bounty hunters. '41 Yet, I am less concerned about these motivations-
altruistic or selfish-so long as they further the public interest by
initiating class litigation.
B. Federalizing the Private Class Action
We see this dichotomy at its extreme in CAFA's legislative
debates. Reacting to allegations that entrepreneurial lawyers lined their
own pockets at the class members' expense and that certain state court
"magnets" created overly hospitable environments for drive-by
certifications affecting national matters, 42 Congress federalized class
actions. 43 CAFA's legislative history also reveals the desire that a
national body, the federal courts, resolve cases affecting the nation as a
whole. 44 John Beisner, CAFA's primary author, testified openly about
(advocating administrative remedies in light of the fundamental class action deficiencies); Peter
H. Schuck, Benched: The Pros and Cons of Having Judges Make the Law, WASH. MONTHLY,
Dec. 2000, at 35, 39.
41 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 35, at 90 ("The 'bounty hunter,' on the other hand, refers to
the private litigants who care little for broader concerns of public interest but are instead focused
exclusively upon the pursuit of their own private interest. As already noted, however, even
litigants falling within this latter category may serve the public interest as an incident to their
pursuit of their own private rights.") (citation omitted); Coffee, supra note 35, at 215-16. For an
overview of some of the cases typically cited for attorney abuse, see Beisner, Shors & Miller,
supra note 35, at 1447-50. Examples of misbehaving attorneys are certainly not limited to the
class action context. See, e.g., Lubna Takuri, Judge Rules in Favor of Dry Cleaner in $54M Suit
Over Missing Pants, LAW.COM, June 26, 2007,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1182762359671 ("Pearson became a worldwide symbol of
legal abuse by seeking jackpot justice from a simple complaint-that a neighborhood dry cleaners
lost the pants from a suit and tried to give him a pair that were not his."). Yet even some scholars
who subscribe to this model agree, "private litigation serves the public interest, regardless of the
motivation of those bringing suit." Redish, supra note 35, at 91. Professor Redish recognizes
that even the Old West bounty hunters "have sought to serve the interests of the community by
apprehending (and sometimes punishing) those who disturb or threaten the public peace." Id.
42 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1178 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[M]any of today's class actions are nothing more than business opportunities for some lawyers
to strike it rich and too often have little, if anything, to do with fairly compensating injured class
members."); see also AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 8 (2004),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2OO4.pdf.
43 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum
in Class Action Litigation. What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593
(2006) ("A major premise of the CAFA is that a federal forum is a superior venue for resolving
class actions with multistate aspects.").
44 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 56-57. As
Stephen Burbank put bluntly, CAFA's legislative history "meet[s] the philosopher Harry
Frankfurt's definition of 'bullshit,' because [it is] made with apparent indifference to [its] truth
content." Aggregation on the Couch, supra note 27, at 1942. See also C. Douglas Floyd, The
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
55 EMORY L.J. 487, 532 (2006) ("[T]he repeated invocation of the language of the Commerce
Clause in the statement of findings and purposes and the legislative history of the Act is a red
HeinOnline  -- 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2525 2007-2008
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this:
Who should be charged with responsibility for handling such types
of large-scale, interstate class actions involving issues with
significant national commerce implications-federal judges who are
selected by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate or state
court judges who are elected by a few thousand voters in a rural
county?
4 5
Still, CAFA reflects less of a hierarchy between state versus federal fora
and more of a preoccupation with strategic gaming for state courts that
would certify a nationwide class where others would not.46
Corporate defendants are, however, quick to complain about
excessive American litigation and decry class actions as legalized
blackmail. 47 There are, to be sure, real examples of class action abuse.
So too are there imperfect juries, pressures to settle, and imperfect
justice. Perhaps this is to be expected in a system that relies primarily
on decentralized, self-motivated private actors for enforcement. 48 And
yet, this is only part of the picture. The primacy of ex post regulation
facilitates easy market entry for products, start up companies, and
financial transactions. 49 The focus from the front-end is on a picture of
a robust economy unsaddled with bureaucratic entry barriers. 50 In
return for what is at times imperfect justice, we receive product
innovation, new businesses, and employment opportunities; all are
generally unhindered by a series of ex ante government hurdles. Both
pictures-simple market entry and sometimes excessive litigation-are
accurate and telling, but only when considered together. It is in this
light that CAFA can be seen for what it is: the country's latest efforts to
rein in ex post accountability enforcement mechanisms.51 Just as laws
curb unfettered economic competition for the public good, procedures
herring.").
45 Class Action Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49 (2002).
46 See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1912 (2006).
47 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 20-21, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21 (noting
that state court judges foster a system of "judicial blackmail"); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for
Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 488-89 (2000);
see also L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Between "'Merit Inquiry" and "Rigorous Analysis":
Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1041, 1084-85 (2004).
48 See KAGAN, supra note 18, at 3; Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 384-85.
49 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 385.
50 Id.
51 See generally id. at 385 ("The country is awash in efforts to restrict the mechanisms of ex
post accountability. Although generically falling under the rubric of 'tort reform,' many of the
proposed alterations of the American legal system are simply efforts to eliminate wholesale the
availability of redress for harms suffered in the marketplace.").
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must be available to enforce those laws.52 This begs the question of
how federalizing class actions affects this ex post enforcement.
II. CAFA's IMPACT ON LITIGATION As REGULATION
This Part considers that question. It initially grapples with how a
venue change undermines substantive law and then how this change
splinters class actions. The crux of this initial struggle is this: although
in passing CAFA, Congress intended to create federal jurisdiction over
claims affecting the national market, 53 it intentionally declined to grant
federal courts the concomitant positive authority to create matching
substantive laws. 54 In fact, in changing the procedures for handling
class actions, Congress expressly swore off any intent to alter Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins's 55 command that federal courts apply the
states' substantive law when sitting in diversity. 56 The effect is
mismatched. It generates a federal forum for putative class actions of
national importance, but then declines certification because applying
various state laws makes the class unmanageable under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 57
Let me explain. The majority of cases caught in CAFA's minimal
diversity removal provision would likely request certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) as opposed to (b)(1) or (b)(2). 58 To certify a class under
52 See generally MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND
POLITICS 99 (1998) ("So long as the public welfare is perceived as requiring that market
relationships be curbed rather than eliminated, justice according to law and pure procedural
justice are certain to retain legitimacy within a part of the domain encompassed by justice.").
53 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
54 See David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1295-96 (2007). A number of
proposals for applying uniform laws to class actions exist. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT § 6.01 cmt. f, at 440-43 (Proposed Final Draft 1993) (recommending that
courts apply the law of defendant's principal place of business).
55 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46 (noting that
CAFA "does not change the application of the Erie Doctrine"); H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 26
(2003) (claiming that CAFA "does not change substantive law-it is, in effect, a procedural
provision only").
57 As Richard Nagareda observed, this prompts plaintiffs' attorneys to shoehorn and recast
state causes of action into RICO violations. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the
Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-10 14659.
58 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) permits certification where the class primarily
requests injunctive or declaratory relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Consequently, most of these
actions are civil rights actions or employment discrimination actions, which already have federal
subject matter jurisdiction through a federal question. It is possible that CAFA may affect some
Rule 23(b)(l)(A) or 23(b)(1)(B) class actions, addressing inconsistent results or limited funds,
but, by and large, these actions are much less prevalent than their more controversial counterpart,
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Rule 23(b)(3), common questions must predominate over individual
ones and the class action must be the superior method for resolving the
claims.59 Moreover, in making this determination, the court considers,
among other factors, "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action. '60 The classic minuet proceeds like this:
class action proponents plead their complaint in generic common terms,
emphasizing patterns and commonality in the offensive acts, whereas
opponents highlight individual issues and manageability problems with
applying multiple states' laws.6' Proponents respond by suggesting sub-
classing under Rule 23(c)(4), denying differences in substantive laws, or
proposing patterned jury instructions.
A. On Certification Procedure-The Substance-Procedure Quagmire
Consequently, it is during this so-called manageability inquiry that
courts consider sticky choice-of-law questions. Under the Erie Doctrine
and the Rules of Decision Act, 62 courts sitting in diversity, as they
would under CAFA, must use substantive state laws. 63 When these
laws vary and the court has to apply numerous states' laws-as is often
the case when defendants remove classes with "nationwide" effects-
courts frequently find the putative class "unmanageable" and refuse to
certify it.64 Based on federalism notions, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.,65 courts must theoretically distinguish this
procedural decision-to certify or not to certify a class-from any
contemplation about the underlying substantive law's remedial
scheme. 66 Realistically, of course, this ruling on certification
Rule 23(b)(3). For an informational overview of the different types of class actions and their
uses, see John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419
(2003).
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
60 Id. R. 23(b)(3)(D).
61 See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1418-19 (2006).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
63 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply the same choice-of-law principles that the state court in the
same location would).
64 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 610 (1997); Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (opting to decertify a nationwide tobacco class action due to
choice-of-law problems); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2005).
65 Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487.
66 Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1875. Certainly the ability of a judge to blind herself to the
merits and to the likelihood of success based on substantive laws is suspect. Linda Mullenix has
concluded that the so-called line between substance and procedure "is inherently unresolvable."
Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997).
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dramatically affects, and often neuters, the remedial scheme's impact.67
When small claims cannot proceed collectively, many will not proceed
at all.
What is more, CAFA's legislative history disapproves of
bootstrapping to apply a single state's law to a nationwide class, thus
forcing non-certification and discouraging creative remedies. 68 This
juxtaposition is caused by two key principles colliding: the aggregation
principle, holding that aggregation should not change applicable
substantive law, and the Erie Doctrine, similarly holding that locating
claims in a federal forum should not change applicable substantive
law.69 The collision leaves us holding some strange pieces.
1. Choice-of-Law
For instance, applying the aggregation principle counsels the
approach taken by Congress in CAFA's legislative history-that is,
rejecting creative bootstrapping of choice-of-law theories to facilitate
class action certification and resolution. 70 But this application also
greatly affects the availability of a substantive remedial scheme. And it
contradicts the intent behind the 1966 Advisory Committee's
amendment to Rule 23. This amendment overcame the collective action
problem by encouraging groups to join forces and vindicate substantive
claims that they wouldn't initiate on their own.71 Even the Supreme
Court invokes this amendment to reveal procedure's dirty little secret:
"[R]ulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects
on the substantive rights of litigants. '72 In short, taking the aggregation
principle to its extreme, thereby undermining substantive remedial
schemes, overlooks wrongdoing. At least so long as the wrongdoing
67 Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1875; see also Solum, supra note 6, at 200, 213-16. Justice
Reed's concurring opinion in Erie acknowledges as much when he notes at that early juncture
that "[t]he line between procedure and substance is hazy .. " Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
68 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 25 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 25 (citing
Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp, 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003), in which the Oklahoma Supreme
Court used Michigan's breach-of-warranty law to certify a nationwide class action, to support the
idea that "state court interference with the laws of other jurisdictions is becomingly disturbingly
common"); H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 14 (2003) (citing Ysbrand for the notion that "[s]tate courts
have trampled on federalism principles.., all in an effort to certify classes that should not be
certified"); Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1919-21.
69 Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1911.
70 See id at 1913-14.
71 See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REv. 497,497 (1969).
72 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989); see also Aggregation on the Couch,
supra note 27, at 1928 (dubbing the use of procedure to alter substantive law procedure's "dirty
little secret").
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affects citizens in a cross-section of states just a little bit. Nationwide
wrongdoing of this type is likely to escape federal class certification and
the small amount makes individual actions unlikely.
Federal courts are less willing to certify these nationwide classes
based on black letter Erie Doctrine. The Erie Doctrine, which includes
Klaxton, provides that a federal forum must apply the substantive law-
including choice-of-law principles-of the state in which it sits. Yet
CAFA's legislative history expressly disapproves of using one state's
law to facilitate certification. 73 An Oklahoma state court, for example,
certified a nationwide breach-of-warranty class action using only
Michigan's warranty law. 74 It reasoned that, under the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, Michigan was "the only state where
conduct relevant to all class members occurred." 75 Congress
condemned this interpretation. 76 Yes, there is plenty of irony to go
around: CAFA purports to preserve Erie but disapproves of its
application. Furthermore, unless the Oklahoma decision was an
aberration (which it may be), applying state choice-of-law principles
may shift the so-called "magnet" courts to federal courts that apply one
state's law to simplify certification. 77
The bottom line is this: either the substantive law in aggregated
actions must differ from that in an individual action, or the substantive
law in a federal forum must depart from that applied in state court. 78
Although the full implications of the relationship between CAFA and
Klaxton exceed this Article's scope, gutting substantive remedial
schemes has derivative effects on procedural justice, deterrence, and
transparency. 79
73 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 25, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 25 (citing Ysbrand, 81
P.3d at 618); H.R. Rep. No. 108-144, at 14 (2003) (same). For more information about the
Ysbrand decision and about choice-of-law in Oklahoma, see Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1916-18;
Steven S. Gensler, Civil Procedure: Class Certification and the Predominance Requirement
Under Oklahoma Section 2023(b)(3), 56 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 297-304 (2003).
74 Ysbrand, 81 P.3d 618.
75 Id. at 625-26. Lamenting Okalahoma's choice, Congress declined to enact a federal
choice-of-law scheme and the Senate even voted down Senator Feinstein's soft-form amendment
that would remind federal courts not to deny class certification simply because it may require the
court to apply the law of more than one state. See 151 CONG. REc. S1215-02, at SA4 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 2005) (text of Sen. Feinstein's proposed amendment).
76 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 25, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 25; H.R. REP. No.
108-144, at 14.
77 See Nagareda, supra note 46, at 1920.
78 Id. at 1911.
79 As a remedy to this problem, Sam Issacharoff has proposed that "[i]n the absence of
national choice of law rules... courts should, as a default rule, apply the laws of the home state
of the defendant to all standardized claims, regardless of the situs of the final injury. Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class
Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1839 (2006).
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2. Non-certification
The most obvious result of the Erie-Klaxton clash is on
certification. Statistical research on CAFA demonstrates the foregone
conclusion: federal courts, as opposed to their state-court counterparts,
are less likely to certify class actions. 80 In cases removed to federal
court and remanded to state court, state courts denied certification 12%
of the time. 81 Conversely, when defendants removed cases and the
federal courts kept them, they denied class certification 27% of the
time-a statistically significant increase compared with state-court
certifications. 82 When federal courts decline to certify a class action,
the action most often concludes through a nonclass settlement. 83 In a
study conducted by Thomas Willging and Shannon Wheatman, roughly
41% of putative class actions in which the federal court expressly
refused to certify a class (as opposed to taking no action on
certification) resulted in nonclass settlements. 84
In all likelihood, these nonclass settlements were not individual
settlements. The economic viability of mass litigation dictates that,
even absent certification, claims proceed collectively if they proceed at
all. 85 Settling certified class actions or certifying for settlement
purposes only requires successful completion of Rule 23's procedural
hurdles: fairness hearings, notification to class members, opt out
periods, 86 judicial blessings, and even judicial approval of class
counsels' fees. 87 Underlying these hurdles is a delicate balancing act.
80 Willging & Wheatman, supra note 43, at 635.
81 Id.
82 Id. Federal courts were slightly more likely to certify cases originally filed in federal court
than those removed to federal court. Id. at 635 n.80.
83 For more discussion of nonclass settlements (and a definition), see infra notes 192-196 and
accompanying text.
84 The study distinguishes between "settled on individual basis" and "settled as part of
another case," however, when cases were consolidated and transferred through multidistrict
litigation the study counted only the lead case as a single or unique case for inclusion in the study.
Thus, cases that were "settled on an individual basis" included cases that settled through
multidistrict litigation. THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION 58-59 (2005), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/clactO5.pdf/$file/clactO5.pdf; Willging & Wheatman,
supra note 43, at 593 n.1 (noting that the Article relied on the methods used in the 2005 Federal
Judicial Center Study cited supra); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMORY G. LEE III, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS 23 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
cafa0407.pdf/$file/cafa0407.pdf. The result is that a portion of the number of cases "settled on an
individual basis" actually settled through some form of aggregation.
85 Erichson, supra note 64, at 1773.
86 Opt out periods are mandatory for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, but discretionary for
certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2). See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(A) & (B).
87 Id. R. 23.
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On one hand, small claims aggregation makes the private attorney
general model worthwhile; on the other, requirements for appointing
class counsel,8 8 approving class settlements, 89 and reviewing attorneys'
fees90 recognize a potential for self-interest to interfere with the private
attorney general's class representation and the dangers of unchecked
"promotion" of "public interest."91
In sum, combining choice-of-law problems, Rule 23(b)(3)'s
manageability requirement, and CAFA's prerequisite that putative class
actions be national in scope leads to less certified classes. This
increases the likelihood that claims will proceed as collective groups or
not at all-inhibiting the class's regulatory function.92 Some might find
this disturbing from a compensation standpoint, since smaller groups,
and thus smaller recoveries and attorneys' fees handicap plaintiffs'
attorneys in presenting their strongest case. But, from a deterrence-
centric position, I am less troubled about this phenomenon producing
lower individual compensation and more concerned that it will lead to
cloudy legal boundaries, less judicial supervision, and less procedural
fairness.
Put differently, because federal courts are less willing to certify
class actions, there are four principal effects-all negative. First, non-
certified actions are either dropped-prompting concern that certain
areas may escape ex post regulation altogether-or they proceed
collectively. The latter creates concerns that the collective process-a
process without judicial quality control-is less procedurally fair.
Second, when non-certified actions settle, the settlements are closed,
private, and often confidential. This decreases transparency, thus
inhibiting the law's behavior-guiding function, and withholds public
educational opportunities. Third, non-certification theoretically thwarts
deterrence by allowing defendants to avoid internalizing the full costs of
their conduct and by making some collective actions too costly to bring.
Finally, non-certification disaggregates plaintiffs' attorneys, making
information-sharing more difficult. The following sections canvass
each effect in turn.
88 Id. R. 23(g).
89 Id. R. 23(e).
90 Id. R. 23(h).
91 In short, mass litigation without Rule 23's protections poses a greater danger than certified
class actions. See infra Part II.B. 1.
92 See L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation
of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 207 (2004) ("[In passing]
the Class Action Fairness Act, which increases the potential for aggregation and intensifies the
pressure on the federal courts to lighten their overburdened dockets, Congress may enhance the
potential for collusion in settlements.").
2532 [Vol. 29:6
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B. On Process
First, non-certification creates the potential for less just procedures.
Illegitimate process-if that is a fair term-colors other positive
spillovers and blackens the ex post regulatory process itself. Procedural
fairness is the justice system's cornerstone; it ensures continued faith in
and public support of both the judiciary and decentralized ex post
regulation. It is true that class litigation strains judicial handling
procedures. Responding to the influx of class actions and other types of
aggregate litigation, federal judges are forced to become increasingly
creative with both process and remedies. 93 And creativity in this regard
should be encouraged so long as it squares with procedural justice
principles. Accordingly, the next Part highlights traditional procedural
justice literature to briefly sketch its normative components and then
discusses CAFA's pull on the already tenuous relationship between
aggregate litigation and fair process.
1. A Normative Theory of Procedural Justice
I begin with a nuts and bolts overview of process-the
fundamental components that theoretically must be satisfied for law to
furnish a legitimate guiding function. Procedural fairness in collective
actions-and indeed in any action-necessitates adequate attorney
representation and informed consent to settlement. Most normative
conceptions of process are, however, too traditional. That is, they are
tethered to individual as opposed to aggregate procedural process. At
the heart of most theories is, in Larry Solum's words, "a process that
guarantees rights of meaningful participation [, which] . . . requires
notice and opportunity to be heard, [and] . . . a reasonable balance
between cost and accuracy." 94 Still, to accommodate aggregate
litigation, these barebones components have been stretched and
shoehorned into a makeshift process that is not altogether satisfactory,
93 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Individual courts are
obligated to rely on the 'innovation and creativity' allowed by inherent equitable power when
confronting the novel challenges of aggregate litigation."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §
22.1 (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/inavgeneral?o
penpage&url-r=/public/home.nsf/pages/524 ("The absence of precedent or of legislative or rule-
making solutions should not foreclose innovation and creativity. Such creativity must be
carefully applied, accompanied by an examination of the specific issues raised in each case, the
legal authority for and against the procedures devised, and other factors that might affect fairness
and efficiency.").
94 Solum, supra note 6, at 183.
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particularly for non-certified class actions.
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are reactionary-that
is, they were enacted to chase and enforce substantive norms-they
cannot (out of a concomitant pledge to efficiency and affordability) 95
hope to assure a perfect outcome. Thus, our aim should be to eradicate
imperfections as much as possible. 96 A limited use of utilitarianism
advances this goal. Utilitarianism, however, is only one of three
components defining procedural justice's boundaries. Utilitarianism,
particularly rule utilitarianism, 97 posits that an act or procedure is "right
if and only if it conforms with the system of rules, which, if universally
followed, would produce the best consequences."' 98 But, this alone
elevates processes that produce accurate results regardless of transaction
costs and time investment. Litigation could go on forever. Still,
accuracy is important since the social institution of adjudication must
produce sound outcomes. 99 The pure cost-benefit aim of maximizing a
non-moral good, however, ignores cultural and political morals that
truly comprise the common good. 100
Given this shortcoming, the second procedural justice component
is fairness. Fairness arguments are typically offered as policy reasons to
trump pursuit of certain reform proposals and aggregate social goals; 10 1
however, I use fairness here (and in assessing CAFA) as a supplemental
constraint rather than a substitute. Employing a deontological
conception of fairness to balance utility aids in, not only distributing
procedural costs and correcting procedural errors, but also in ensuring
that the procedural system does not disproportionately favor or burden
plaintiffs or defendants. 10 2 Put differently, process should disperse the
risk of error and the cost of access as evenly as possible. Neither party
95 See id. at 247 ("Given that civil procedure imposes real costs on litigants and society at
large, it is difficult to argue that the smallest marginal gain in accuracy is worth the largest
investment of resources. Justice has a price, and there is a point at which that price is not worth
paying.").
96 See id at 245-46 ("That the system is not actually perfect does not mean that perfect
procedural justice is not its aspiration; perfect procedural justice can be the animating principle of
procedural doctrine, even though a residue of inaccuracy exists, despite the system's best
efforts.").
97 Solum observes, "The way that rule utilitarianism supports systemic accuracy over case
accuracy is clear: to the extent that accuracy is a good consequence, rule utilitarianism counsels in
favor of the general rule that will promote the greatest accuracy in the long run." Id. at 251
n. 182.
98 Id at 253.
99 See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories
of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485, 510 (2003); cf Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 888
("From a utilitarian standpoint, functional productivity is maximized when the sum of all accident
costs-including injury losses, avoidance costs, and administrative costs-is minimized.").
100 See Solum, supra note 6, at 256-57.
101 Bone, supra note 99, at 487.
102 See Solum, supra note 6, at 257.
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should have an advantage. 103 This idea of "fairness" as avoiding
lopsided distribution of error can be likened to the concept of
"neutrality."' 0 4 To be sure, some imparity in distributing risks may be
inevitable.
Finally, although analogous to fairness, participation-manifested
as adequate representation in the class context-humanizes process. 0 5
In its simplest form, participation necessitates that those who are bound
by a decision have an opportunity to take part (and be heard) in
adjudication. 0 6 Moreover, it encompasses inherent rights to present
evidence, observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear
the judge's decision. 107 And participation, even in class litigation,
affords litigants dignity by granting them a forum in which to tell their
story. 0 8 "Storytelling" has been criticized when used to demonstrate
satisfaction with process as a proxy for "justice."'1 9 I use the term here,
however, for its cathartic value only when situated within this larger
103 Id. at 257-58; Bone, supra note 99, at 514 ("In addition to considering the risk of error, a
theory of procedural fairness also must take account of process costs, including the social costs of
additional procedure to reduce error, and it must do so within the framework of the fairness
theory itself."); see also MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATNG TO
INDIVIDUALS 117-20 (1990).
104 In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., Justice Marshall commented on neutrality's importance as
"preserve[ing] both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important to
a popular government, that justice has been done."' 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."); see generally BAYLES, supra note 103, at 19 (observing, "[t]hat procedural justice
requires an impartial decisionmaker is almost universally recognized").
105 See Chamblee [Burch), supra note 92, at 209 ("The core of the Court's Amchem decision
held that a class action attorney could adequately represent only a class with sufficient
cohesion."). On the issue of representation, see Fiss, supra note 27, at 25 ("The class action is in
fact a representative lawsuit-as noted, the named plaintiff is bringing a suit on behalf of all the
unnamed members of the class-but it employs a peculiar concept of representation: self-
appointment.").
106 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (contending that "the promotion of
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process" is a central
feature of the Due Process Clause); Solum, supra note 6, at 273-74.
107 BAYLES, supra note 103, at 40 ("The common-law principle of an opportunity to be heard
has typically been taken to include rights (1) to adequate notice, (2) to pre-hearing discovery, (3)
to an adjournment, (4) to present evidence, (5) to rebut evidence and often to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, (6) to a copy of the transcript, and (8) [sic] to reasons for a decision.")
(citations omitted); Solum, supra note 6, at 280.
108 See generally Solum, supra note 6, at 262-64 (noting that dignity is a component of
participation); Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and
Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 160 (2002) ("As researchers have
learned, litigants report more satisfaction with types of processes in which they understand
themselves as having an opportunity to give voice to their injuries, make their defenses, be treated
with dignity, and have their claims heard and evaluated by unbiased decisionmakers."); Deborah
R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 93-
96 (2002). This respect for dignity of the individual resembles the Kantian ideal of respect for
persons. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 69, 74-76.
109 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 99, at 505-07.
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procedural fairness framework.
Participation's value may be best realized in its antithesis: imagine
a system in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could
participate. Two flaws appear. First, how could such a system yield
accurate results? Second, how could the public view that system as
legitimate and thus authoritative? From this, we glean that participation
increases accurate results, enhancing the utilitarian ideal, and that for
"justice" to somehow materialize, the public must see the process as
legitimate. 110 Legitimacy does not, however, require actual
participation but rather the opportunity to participate at crucial points
during the proceedings. 111 As an obvious example, for a settlement
decision to be legitimate, the litigants must participate and consent.
Legitimacy, as a participation subset, is itself a public good.
Again, consider the converse. If the public considers a particular law
illegitimate, then it can morally rationalize disobedience. Pragmatically
then, citizens must regard the procedure as legitimate to ensure
voluntary cooperation and participation. As Solum observes on this
point, "A society in which citizens can reasonably regard themselves as
having a content-independent obligation to obey the law is better than a
society in which the law begins with a presumption of illegitimacy."' 2
In brief, procedural justice requires accuracy, as derived from
utilitarianism; fairness, in terms of neutral and symmetrical distribution
of costs and risks of error; and participation, which affords dignity to
litigants and legitimacy to process. The key is that focusing singularly
on any one component to the others' exclusion distorts fair process.
2. Consequentialist and Deontological Critique of Post-CAFA
Process
With this traditional procedural justice model as a baseline, we can
compare post-CAFA process. Deviating from this model, CAFA affects
the ex post regulatory process in two ways-both negative. First,
CAFA splinters would-be class actions (complete with judicial
oversight and approval) into collective actions with no judicial
monitoring despite the presence of similar inherent dangers that make
continued judicial involvement necessary in the class context." 3 This
represents (a) a deontological argument that process disproportionately
disfavors claimants due to deficiencies in the representational model of
110 See Solum, supra note 6, at 274-77.
111 Id. at 275; Bone, supra note 99, at 510 (questioning why participation and control are
necessary for institutional legitimacy).
112 Solum, supra note 6, at 278.
113 Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92, at 183-85.
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participation and (b) a corresponding consequentialist concern about
whether, without this adequate representation, the process produces the
best result. Put simply, defendants usually win the certification battle.
Second, federalizing class actions means that these litigants have less
access to judges. Because CAFA taxes federal courts with complex
cases, judges will likely respond by expanding the courts' bureaucratic
infrastructure with more special masters, magistrates, and claims
resolution facilities. These apprehensions over bureaucratization reflect
consequentialist concerns about accuracy but also profound concerns
with legitimacy and access.
Consider first the criticism that CAFA exacerbates the incidence of
collective settlements, thereby prompting deontological participation
anxiety over adequate attorney-client representation. 1 4 Understanding
this argument requires a brief explanation of the counterfactual
traditional idea of adjudication. Conventional wisdom wrongly assumes
that when a putative class action does not proceed as a certified class it
reverts to the traditional form of individual piecemeal litigation."l 5 This
view further presumes that clients protect their own interests through
established norms such as monitoring attorney conduct, deciding and
negotiating settlement terms, overseeing the conduct of litigation, and
performing other functions that a client would in a usual lawyer-client
relationship.1 6 That is not the case.
Although conventional wisdom understands the dichotomy
between individual and class action litigation well enough, it ignores the
inevitable: when putative classes are not certified, they do not proceed
on an individual basis in the traditional sense but proceed in clustered
menageries with varying cohesion. In short, non-certified actions,
particularly mass torts, proceed as collective actions that lead almost
inevitably to aggregate settlements. By "collective actions" and
"aggregate settlements" I mean to portray cases in which scale
economies make representation possible; where an attorney represents
numerous claimants but lacks a significant lawyer-client relationship
with each; where individual claimants thus have little substantive input
or authority over how the attorney handles the case; and where the
114 CAFA's Balkanizing effect on would-be classes may also prompt counsel to avoid the cost
and delay associated with certification and opt instead for nonclass vehicles that allow for mass
settlements. These vehicles might include multi-district litigation, informal coordination,
aggregation through Rule 20 or consolidation through Rule 42. See FED. R. CIv. P. 20
(Permissive Joinder of Parties); id R. 42(a) (Consolidation).
115 See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92, at 159-60; Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class
Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525-26 (2003) ("Non-class mass collective representation, moreover, seems
to invite muddled thinking among judges, clients, and lawyers. Too many judges treat class
action problems as though the alternative is autonomous individual litigation, when in fact the
alternative is more likely to be some form of mass collective representation.").
116 See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92, at 159.
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attorney must, as a result of these circumstances, direct her loyalty to
obtaining the best result for the collective group."i7
Procedural justice's traditional participation principle stretches to
accommodate aggregate litigation by assuming that individuals within
the group have an adequate legal representative. This representative
fairly considers and protects that individual's interests. 118 But what
happens when individuals within the same group who are represented
by the same attorney have divergent or incompatible interests? The
procedural answer in the certified class context is to create
subclasses,1 9 each with its own representative and attorney. 120 There is
no procedural answer in nonclass aggregation. Instead, we must look to
ethical rules. Rule 1.8(g) of the American Bar Associations Model
Rules of Professional Conduct forbids attorneys from aggregately
settling claims of two or more clients "unless each client gives informed
consent." 121 If these ethical rules alone were sufficient to ensure
adequate legal representation, then why develop separate structural
safeguards for class actions? The answer surely cannot be limited to the
Hansberry notion that class actions bind members who are not present
117 See id; Erichson, supra note 115, at 525. Mancur Olson, who appears to be the
primogenitor of the "collective action" phrase used it to mean "any problem that provides benefits
and/or costs for more than one individual, so that some coordination of efforts is required."
TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 9 (1992). From this, we
glean that questions surrounding the collective somehow have to do with groups of people who
gather around one central problem but at least one of the crowd must take action. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 n.6
(1991). Thus enters the plaintiffs' attorney. I should note that Congress explicitly amended
CAFA to exclude these collective settlements. H.R. REP. No. 109-7, at 2 (2005).
118 See Solum, supra note 6, at 317. The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation recognize that in all forms of aggregate proceedings, "control of litigation of
claims or defenses is separated from ownership of those claims or defenses" and that "[d]ifferent
aggregate proceedings endow participants with different levels of control over the proceedings."
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04 (Am. Law Inst., discussion draft,
Apr. 21, 2006).
119 For more information on sub-classing, see Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2351 (2006).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) & (c)(5).
121 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2004). Disciplinary Rule 5-106 of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility may also cover settling aggregate litigation. MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106 (Settling of Similar Claims of Clients). Every state
has adopted Rule 1.8(g) or a similarly worded rule. See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass
Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 734 (1997). A
recent proposal by the American Law Institute in its Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation would further impinge on the informed consent requirement. Section 3.17(c) provides,
"An individual claimant may, after consultation with counsel, affirmatively agree to be bound by
a non-class aggregate settlement without prior knowledge of and consent to the terms of other
claimants' settlements by agreeing to accept an aggregate settlement as part of a known collective
representation." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §3.17(c). This proposal
essentially requires claimants to opt-in to a procedure rather than to provide informed consent to
settlement terms. It thus waives the aggregate settlement rule and is difficult to reconcile with the
participation principle of procedural justice.
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as parties.122 It seems instead to hint at the possibility of inadequate
representation, of collusion, and of inherent conflicts of interests. 123
And I realize that "collusion" is a loaded term. Still, the circumstances
of nonclass settlements, even with client "consent"--such that it is-are
troubling. Perhaps they are not as troubling as the Ortiz 124 and
Amchem 25 settlements, which manufactured the term, but worrisome
nevertheless. If the outcome is controlled by desires for a higher
attorney's fee in exchange for generous settlement terms, it represents
neither the best nor most accurate conclusion. 26 The class action's
regulatory function is similarly undermined.
In one respect, however, CAFA strengthened representation and
decreased collusion's likelihood. Before CAFA, any attorney in state or
federal court could claim to represent the putative class's interests.
Outside of the federal system, courts had no way to identify or appoint
the best competitor. This overlapping jurisdiction created a so-called
''race to the bottom": competing plaintiffs' attorneys clamored to offer
the defendant the best deal in exchange for a percentage of the
attorneys' fee. 127 Before CAFA, even if a state case was competing
with a similar one in federal court, the federal court could not interfere
unless it used the All Writs Act as an exception to the Anti-Injunction
122 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("It is familiar doctrine of the federal
courts that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the
judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present, or where they
actually participate in the conduct of the litigation .. "). For thoughtful commentary on this
decision and on adequate representation in the class context, see Richard Nagareda,
Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REv. 287 (2003).
123 See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There
Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 129, 145-55 (2001); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 715-
16(1986).
124 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
125 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
126 1 have written elsewhere about the potential for collusion in nonclass aggregation of mass
torts and noted:
Representing catalogues or inventories of claimants often leads to conflicts of interest
that attorneys may not be able to foresee at the beginning of litigation, such as
differences among bargaining positions, clients' divergent desires to settle or litigate,
or the extent of latent injuries. These repeat players may adjust their litigation tactics
according to an expectation that they will meet again, and settlements may reflect past
traditions and the need for future negotiations rather than the merits of the claims.
Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92, at 171-72.
127 See generally id. at 170-72 (commenting on how collusion might occur); see Luban, supra
note 7, at 2649; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1358-59 (1995). Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg term these settlements
"sweetheart settlements" and note that "[a]ccording to this argument, the defendant and class
counsel have a joint incentive to negotiate a settlement that gives the class counsel a generous
attorney's fee, but gives the class members less than the fair value of their claims." Bruce Hay &
David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1389 (2000).
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Act. 128 Still, federal courts refereed rarely and then only when they
neared a settlement that could be likened to a res. 129 By federalizing
class actions, CAFA reroutes this race. Granted, if the defendant
chooses to park a collusive settlement in state court, 130 CAFA does
nothing to prevent this.
But, when defendants remove actions to multiple federal courts,
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has authority to transfer
and consolidate the actions before a single judge for pretrial
proceedings when a majority of plaintiffs request it.131 Of course, in
putative class actions, the court can use Rule 23(g) to appoint class
counsel. Still, federal judges also retain liberal authority to designate
lead counsel in collective actions. In so doing, judges ensure that
counsel is "qualified and responsible," that "[counsel] will fairly and
adequately represent" the claimants, and that the class counsel's
attorneys' fees are reasonable. 132 Ensuring competent counsel
alleviates, but does not eliminate, the need for judicial review of
nonclass aggregate settlements. 33
Nonclass collective actions present a procedural justice dilemma.
On one hand, the participatory legitimacy thesis dictates that inadequate
attorney representation in aggregate litigation renders process
illegitimate. On the other hand, collective actions often make litigation
economically viable where participants would have no real means for
128 Anti-suit injunctions are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), which provides: "A court
of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), is often read to
provide the positive authority for issuing an injunction where in necessary aid of the federal
court's jurisdiction. Thus, it falls under one of the Anti-suit Injunction Act's exceptions. Courts
occasionally cite In re Baldwin United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985), for the proposition
that federal courts can, under the All Writs Act, issue an anti-suit injunction against both parties
and nonparties in aid of its jurisdiction if a class action settlement is imminent. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected an expansive use of the All Writs Act in Sygenta Crop Protection, Inc.
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
129 See, e.g., Baldwin, 770 F.2d at 337. A "res" is property or objects as opposed to people.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (8th ed. 2004).
130 Defendants can park collusive settlements in state court by choosing not to remove the
putative class to federal court.
131 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)( 1)(C)(ii) (2008). Even without
plaintiffs' request, the defendants could request transfer under § 1404 or § 1406 to a forum where
other similar actions are pending. Once in the same court, the judge could order consolidation for
both pre-trial and trial purposes under Rule 42(a). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406; FED. R. Civ. P.
42(a).
132 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 93, § 10.22. In appointing counsel, the
Manual for Complex Litigation further proposes that the judge consider counsel's qualifications,
disclosure of agreements, counsel's competence, compensation guidelines, attorney resources,
counsel's respect among colleagues, and counsel's ability to work cooperatively with opposing
counsel and the court. Id. §§ 10.224, 40.22 (sample order).
133 The Manual for Complex Litigation observes, "[o]rdinarily, settlement does not require
judicial review and approval." Id. §13.14 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
375 (1994)).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2540 2007-2008
CAFA 'S IMPA CT
accessing the judicial system. The deontological argument that
collective actions may disproportionately disfavor claimants (i.e.,
defendants win) due to deficiencies in the representational model of
participation remains troublesome. From a consequentialist perspective,
less-than-ideal representation may be justified by pragmatic
considerations of cost and access. 134 Surely something is better than
nothing. Otherwise, the quest for perfect process could eviscerate any
remedy and render participation of any kind illusory.135
Scale economies, resource pooling, and information sharing are
just some of the benefits achieved by amassing an inventory of similarly
situated clients. 3 6 Moreover, because class actions (and I would add
quasi-class actions) perform a supplemental regulatory function, the
public is left with a choice between mass litigation with faulty process
and inept individual suits. In light of this tension, it seems that even
imperfectly executing procedural principles is more appealing than the
prospect of non-enforcement. In short, even though the process may not
produce the best result, it at least produces some result as opposed to a
complete inability to sue individually. Although a full-fledged solution
to this dilemma exceeds this Article's scope, I have proposed elsewhere
that judges have the authority to review nonclass aggregate settlements
and that some of the required conventions for approving class
settlements are also appropriate in quasi class actions. 137 For instance,
in the Zyprexa litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein tied this inherent
authority to the court's general equitable power. 138 He reasoned that
even though the aggregate settlement was a private agreement, it shared
class action characteristics, which necessitated close supervision to
ensure fairness. 139 This oversight also helps maintain the integrity of
the class's ex post regulatory function.
134 As one plaintiffs attorney commented: "If you can't sign up enough plaintiffs, the
economics don't work." Erichson, supra note 115, at 547 (citing the author's Interview with
Danny Abel, Esq. (Jan. 6, 2002)).
135 See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication
in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383, 399 (2007).
136 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the very core
of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.") (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F.3d 338,
344 (7th Cir. 1997)); Erichson, supra note 115, at 547-48.
137 Chamblee [Burch), supra note 92, at 241; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F.
Supp. 2d 268, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Weinstein, J.) (recognizing a need for judicial oversight in
nonclass collective actions); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478
(E.D.N.Y. 2006)); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.18 (Am. Law Inst.,
discussion draft, Apr. 21, 2006) (proposing limited judicial review for nonclass aggregate
settlements).
138 Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
139 Id. at 271-72.
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Both nonclass aggregation and certified class actions are affected
by the second procedural justice-based CAFA critique:
bureaucratization. CAFA swells the federal court docket with complex
cases, causing the court to rely increasingly on bureaucracy for relief.
There are two parts to the criticism of this causal effect. The first is a
consequentialist concern over outcome-based accuracy in back-end
regulation. A managerial judge faced with a close class certification
question plus a burgeoning docket might be tempted either not to rule
on the motion to certify or to deny the motion depending on how the
action affects her future workload. 140 Statistics indicate that if judges
take no action on certification, litigants voluntarily dismiss 31% of the
cases; if judges deny certification, then litigants voluntarily dismiss
19% of the cases.' 41
Certifying class actions leads to extended battles over discovery,
experts, and class-wide settlements, which might persuade a judge to
delay ruling. And yet, conceding this proposition-that judges faced
with difficult decisions will always take the least resistant path-
illegitimates judicial institutional design. The problem is ubiquitous
and pervades all levels and forms of government. To be sure, this
makes checks and balances necessary, but such measures already exist
within the judicial system. District court judges are subject to
multifaceted layers of accountability including appellate review, 142
precedent constraints, judicial codes of conduct, 143 and even
impeachment. 144 The most worrisome, of course, for judges is the
possibility of reversal on appeal. While incremental adjustments to
institutional design may enhance the consequentialist's accuracy ideal,
the system's foundation cannot be mistrust.
The second and more significant bureaucratization criticism
derives from the legitimacy-participation principle. Federalizing class
actions facilitates coordination and consolidation of once dueling state-
federal actions, allowing them to amass in the federal courts. 145 After
140 For example, Mark Moller argues that "[c]lass certification decisions are susceptible to two
sources of bias: political bias and bias that stems from courts' own self-interest in docket
clearance." Mark Moller, The Anti-Constitutional Culture, 30 REG. 50, 53 (2007). Still, Moller
contends that certification promotes docket clearance, which might be true from a settlement
standpoint. Id. at 55. Statistics show, however, that there may be more judicial work once
certification occurs, so my critique posits the opposite-that judges might be less inclined to
certify a class based on docket clearance.
141 Willging & Wheatman, supra note 43, at 636 (finding that nineteen percent of cases not
certified as class actions are voluntarily dismissed).
142 Litigants may immediately request appellate review when a judge grants or denies class
certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
143 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(2) (2004) (requiring judges to be
faithful to the law).
144 Even federal judges may be removed through impeachment. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2
&art. I, §3.
145 To be sure, there are other contributing causes to the increase in juridical workload such as
2542 [Vol. 29:6
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all, there are over 10,000 state-court trial judges 146 and only 678 federal
district court judges 147 with varying numbers of judicial vacancies. 148
After CAFA, the number of diversity class actions increased from 27
cases per month to approximately 53, placing an added strain on federal
judicial resources. 149 CAFA therefore constricts the fundamental right
of access to the courts, to process of any kind, and to justice. 150 In
elucidating this right, the Supreme Court observed that it is a "right
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly
government."' 15 1 Granted, although CAFA obstructs access to state
courts, it does not eviscerate adjudication in a way that would trigger
this fundamental right. Still, less access may have derivative effects on
systemic legitimacy and ex post regulation.152
If nothing else, CAFA exacerbates overloaded federal dockets and
stimulates a retreat into bureaucracy to cope with excess work. 153 In the
twentieth century, Congress and the judiciary responded to the
expanding aegis of adjudication by broadening administrative agency
authority, 154 embedding teeth in arbitration provisions, 155 and
a growing American society, litigant innovation, and the creation of new rights.
146 According to the National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, there are
roughly 10,160 state court judges in unified and general jurisdiction courts. EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS 18 (Richard Y. Schauffier et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2005_files/0-EWWhole%20Documentfinal_ 1 .pdf
Civil cases comprise approximately 16.9% of the work handled by these judges. Id at 15.
147 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Vacancies: Authorized Judgeships,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cfapps/webnovada/CFFB_301/index.cfln?fuseaction=Reports.ViewJud
geships (last visited March 27, 2008).
148 As of June 10, 2007, there were thirteen vacancies on the courts of appeals and thirty-seven
on the district court level. Robert Barnes & Michael Abramowitz, Conservatives Worry About
Court Vacancies, WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at A4.
149 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1, 2 (2007),
http://www.fic.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/resbrf0i .pdf/$file/resbrf01 .pdf ("Seventy percent of the
study districts experienced an increase in diversity class action filings in the last twelve months of
the study period (July 2005 through June 2006), compared to the last full calendar year before
CAFA went into effect (2004).).
150 The Supreme Court has recognized access to courts as a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Ryland v.
Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The right of access to the courts is basic to our
system of government, and it is well established today that it is one of the fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution.").
151 Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148.
152 See Luban, supra note 7, at 2625 ("However, when disputants turn elsewhere for
resolution-private arbitration, nonjudicial government agencies, or private bargaining-the
salience of adjudication fades and the authority of courts weakens.").
153 Ironically, one early commentator on the problem of bureaucracy suggested that its cure
could be found if Congress "[took] a hard look at where the bulk of the federal caseload comes
from and determine[d] where, given limitations of judicial time, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts can best be cut back." Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 777, 793 (1981).
154 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
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encouraging heavy-handed mediation. 156 With expanded delegation has
come a winnowing of traditional judicial adjudication. 157 To a greater
degree after CAFA, special masters or magistrate court judges will
supervise pretrial matters and settlement negotiations. 158 Moreover,
judges have adopted an activist settlement approach, often mandating
settlement conferences with other judges, special masters, magistrates,
or private attorney mediators. 159 Post-settlement procedure falls
increasingly to "claims resolution facilities"-ad hoc administrative
agencies. 160 Process stretches, adapts, transforms.
So what could be wrong with expanding bureaucracy if it
sustains-and even oils-the wheels of justice? True, bureaucratization
is a pragmatic solution. And yet it diffuses responsibility and distances
litigants from the decisionmaker-creating a barrier to participation and
subjecting the process to criticisms of illegitimacy. As highlighted in
the CAFA debate, procedure serves two masters: it sets the terms for
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C); Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in
Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581 (1951).
155 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Crysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
156 See Resnik, supra note 108, at 155 (commenting on the pressure judges use to encourage
settlement).
157 See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1102
(2006).
158 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 93, at § 13.13 (suggesting that
judges "refer the parties to another judge or magistrate judge for settlement negotiations"); see
generally Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2010 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, The
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1447-48 (1983) (describing the increased
use of special masters and magistrate judges). The use of special masters is generally authorized
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Further, Rule 23, governing class actions, notes that
"[tihe court may refer issues related to [attorneys' fees] to a special master or a magistrate judge
as provided in Rule 52(d)(2)(D)." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(4).
159 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 93, at § 13.13; Francis E. McGovern,
A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1810-11 (2006) ("If a court
viewed the defendants as impediments to settlement, it would not be unusual for a court to set
large numbers of cases for trial at the same time, even empanelling multiple juries for a single
trial."); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA
L. REV. 889, 909 (1991). Some courts have imposed penalties on litigants for failing to try to
settle a case. For an example, see Shedden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 484 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
160 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 93, at § 13.13 ("Judges have also used
special masters to assist in settlement of complex litigation and in postsettlement claims-
resolution proceedings. The judge can arrange for the special master's compensation with the
agreement of the parties and select an individual from a list provided by the parties.") (internal
cross-reference omitted); Lahav, supra note 135, at 391; Francis E. McGovern, The What and
Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2005). For an example of an
agency created to deal with a mass tort, see KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH? THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005) (detailing Feinberg's
work involving the administrative allocation of funds); Lahav, supra note 135, at 413 ("The
quasi-administrative agency created as a result of the Diet Drugs settlement was privately created,
subject to court approval, and then privately administered.").
HeinOnline  -- 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2544 2007-2008
CAFA 'S IMPA CT
resolving disputes and guides actions.16 1 Larry Solum contends that
"[f]or adjudicative procedure to perform its action-guiding function
well, procedures and their outcomes must be regarded as legitimate
sources of authority for officials, third parties, and litigants .... If the
system is seen as illegitimate or without authority, then the system may
fail."162
On this question of whether judicial bureaucracies can preserve the
veneer of legitimacy, Owen Fiss argues that when a judge signs her
name to an opinion, she assumes responsibility. 163 Moreover, although
"[w]e accept the judicial power on these terms, . . . bureaucratization
raises the spectre that the judge's signature is but a sham and that the
judge is exercising power without genuinely engaging in the dialogue
from which his authority flows. ' 164 This cuts through the rhetoric of the
so-called "opportunity to be heard." Rather, for legitimate process,
litigants must actually be heard while participating in a dialogue. 165
Yet, because bureaucracy alienates the judge from the litigants,
critics label this "rule by nobody." 166 Alienation thus creates a
procedural deficiency by inhibiting litigant participation. Academics
have proposed various means for cutting this Gordian knot, ranging
from using fewer special masters, to authorizing more district and
circuit judgeships, to creating special tribunals. 167 Each has its own
assets and flaws. Still, a full reform proposal and analysis extends
beyond this section's focus on how CAFA affects bureaucratization and
process.
In short, bureaucratization presents a trade-off between using a
process tainted with illegitimacy or further restricting access to justice.
Again the system is confronted with a need and desire to push down
work that seems trivial or mundane and to forge a bureaucratic
infrastructure that accommodates this push. Outsourcing mediation to
161 See Solum, supra note 6, at 189 (observing that "the action-guiding work of substantive
law is inextricably entangled in the action-guiding work of procedural law").
162 Id. at 189.
163 Fiss, supra note 158, at 1443
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1456 ("A judge who exercises power without fully engaging in the dialogue that is
the source of his authority-who leaves it to others to listen to a grievance or to explain a
decision-is like a biologist who reports an opinion he has not tested by the scientific method.
He may have hit upon the right result, but there is no reason for us to believe that he is right, or
even that he is likely to be so. He has no claim to our respect."); see also BAYLES, supra note
103, at 170 (observing that "[t]he goal of bureaucratic investigation is to implement a purpose or
policy set by others" as opposed to implementing societal norms in the process of justice).
166 Fiss, supra note 158, at 1458 (commenting that where "[r]esponsibility is shared with the
multitude of other judges and with the impersonal forces and inanimate mechanisms that so
pervade complex organizations .... [t]he Rule of Nobody becomes triumphant"); see also Lahav,
supra note 135, at 393 ("The alienation argument is based on the criticism that bureaucracy is a
rule by nobody.").
167 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 158, at 1463-66.
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private attorneys, relegating discovery and case administration to
special masters and magistrates, and authorizing private claims
resolution facilities to disburse settlement proceeds fosters access to a
new kind of system--one that is substandard from a participatory,
legitimacy, and regulatory standpoint. Bureaucratic justice builds
barriers between litigants and judges making direct participation
difficult and rendering the litigation process sterile. It begs the
question: to what extent are we willing to accept diluted process for
claims that strengthen the ex post regulation system? This is the crux of
the tension between post-CAFA procedural justice and the need to
accommodate collective litigation for ex post regulation.
Any debate over this trade-off must consider the effects on
deterrence and regulation. It must also consider the extent to which
public views of legitimacy will tolerate private ordering through
bureaucracy, collective settlements, and other forms of judicial
diversion. Although one might hope that ex ante regulation would
prevent massive harms, this hope avoids tough questions over the
proper balance between enabling regulation through litigation and
preserving access to judges and the courts.
C. On the Public Benefits of Class Litigation
Thus far, this Article has focused on the ways in which class
litigation is a public good-performing a semi-public ex post regulatory
function and shaping and defining its procedural justice limits. By
making non-certification more likely, CAFA spoils these goods. It
changes the class action's regulatory punch. And, as we will see in this
Part, to the extent that society is willing to concede that ex post
regulation does more good than harm, non-certification (and thus
CAFA) also impairs some of the class action's positive spillovers.
As we begin to consider CAFA's effect on the spillovers of
transparency, deterrence, and precedent, bear in mind that not always,
but oftentimes, class actions are controversial because of the underlying
claims. Consider mass tort litigation such as Agent Orange, 168
asbestos, 169 Vioxx, 170 Bendectin, 171 Bridgestone/Firestone tires, 172 Diet
168 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 100 F.R.D. 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
169 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
170 In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 2006 WL 1726675 (5th Cir. May 26, 2006); see, e.g., Vioxx
Damage Award, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at C8; Ignoring the Warnings, Again?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2007, at A18.
171 See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
172 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Drugs, 173 and tobacco; 174 employment class actions on gender
discrimination such as Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.;175 and securities
fraud class actions concerning Enron, 176 Worldcom, 177 and
HealthSouth. 178 These cases and their outcomes are obviously
important to the public. Public ability to see the inner workings of both
controversial and non-controversial actions lends legitimacy to this
divisive regulatory process. Thus, I consider transparency as a positive
externality alongside the traditional externalities--deterrence and
preclusion.
1. Transparency
Recall that CAFA increases the incidence of private nonclass
settlements. On one hand, what could the public possibly lose when
litigants privately settle collective actions? To be sure, private
settlements alleviate strain on the court system and thus furnish a mild
economic benefit to taxpayers. Moreover, settlements are, after all,
agreements where parties consent to negotiating their dispute in lieu of
expensive litigation costs. 179 Still, the troubling difference between
class action settlements with judicial approval and aggregate settlements
without that approval again appears. As we will see, the tension
between traditional individualized process and aggregate litigation
resurfaces.
Class action settlements, settlements that are court approved after a
public fairness hearing, supply a window into the mysterious class
action process. This window educates the public sector about legal
obligations and remedies.180 As Judith Resnik observed, "Public access
to proceedings in court has become a signature feature of courts,
resulting in practices so familiar as to be under-theorized.
[T]hrough access, the public is educated, the judges and litigants and
173 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 282
F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002).
174 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
175 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), withrdrawn and superceded by 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2007); see, e.g., Abigail Goldman, Wal-Mart Loses Job-Bias Appeal: The Retailer Must Face a
Class-Action Suit on Behalf of 1.5 Million Women, A Panel Rules, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2007, at
C-3; Sid Cassese, Calling for Changes at Wal-Mart, NEWSDAY, Nov. 22, 2006, at A 17 (noting
that protestors called for a boycott of Wal-Mart until it ended its discriminatory practices).
176 In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see, e.g., Ex-Enron
Executive Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C8.
177 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
178 In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
179 Bone, supra note 99, at 521.
180 See generally Resnik, supra note 157, at 1102 (commenting on what is lost when
adjudication is no longer public).
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lawyers are supervised, and knowledge of legal requirements is
disseminated."'' 81 On a macro level, fairness hearings, conducted in
courthouses open to the public, create opportunities for even greater
insight into both substantive laws and procedures.182
That class litigation-particularly mass torts litigation, including
cigarette, asbestos, handguns, and prescription drugs-has become a
controversial forum for debating public policy, amplifies the need for
public access. 183 And while there is a legitimate argument that these
debates should occur in legislative-not court-hearings,184 it seems
that court battles are sometimes a necessary antecedent to legislative
action.
As we've seen, sacrificing ideal process to accommodate aggregate
litigation creates a greater need for above-the-board openness in
collective settlements. Open hearings let the public observe state and
federal actors generating social norms and enforcing ethical constraints
on corporations that frequently seem untouchable.185 Some have argued
that using class litigation as a venue for social policy debates is harmful
to society and undemocratic because it permits judges, lawyers, and
(sometimes) juries to shape policy. 86 That may be true. It is certainly
181 Id. at 1113-14; see also Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 405,405-26 (1987).
182 See generally Resnik, supra note 157, at 1103 ("The literal and material presence of
adjudication stems in part from its performative qualities: much of the activity occurs in buildings
open to the public.").
183 See generally Erichson, supra note 37, at 2093 (observing that mass tort litigation has
gained increasing recognition as a forum for public policy); Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social
Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research
Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 493, 495 (2001) (noting the use of "social policy torts" to bring
attention to legislative and social change); cf Ted Gup, America's Secret Obsession, WASH.
POST, June 12, 2007, at BO1 ("Excessive secrecy is at the root of multiple scandals-the phantom
weapons of mass destruction, the collapse of Enron, the tragedies traced to Firestone tires and
Vioxx, and more.").
184 See, e.g., Asbestos Compensation Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1957, 109th Cong. §2(a)(7)
(2005) ("[A]sbestos personal injury litigation can be unfair and inefficient, imposing a severe
burden on litigants and taxpayers alike[.]").
185 There a number of theories about the relationship between litigation, law, and norms. See,
e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694-95 (1996) (suggesting that
norms influence laws); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2025-29 (1996) (claiming that laws influence norms).
186 See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW 314 (2003) ("[H]owever uncertain the results of
democracy, however slow and clumsy its procedures, we can feel quite sure that it is a better
course than agreeing to turn over our rights of self-government to a new class of unaccountable
lawyers."); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 694 (2007) ("Derogatorily referred to as 'regulation through
litigation,' mass litigation against tobacco, breast implant, gun, and a number of drug and other
product manufacturers is often considered to be an illegitimate end-run around the political
process rather than a supplemental institutional mechanism for making products safer.") (footnote
omitted); Redish, supra note 35, at 73 ("[ln all too many cases, the modem class action has
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true that social policies underlying mass litigation, particularly certain
types of mass torts, have created odd bedfellows-alliances between
activists and trial lawyers. 187 And yet, when collective litigation
affecting public norms ends in a private aggregate settlement, these
alliances may appear elitist and secretive. The public is one-step further
removed from the process and the settlement's implications are subject
neither to public scrutiny nor to appellate review. If the public cannot
observe justice being done-through written decisions or open
proceedings-it might conclude that there is something to hide.
More often than not, aggregate settlement agreements include
confidentiality provisions. 188 These provisions withhold information
from the public that could be essential to informed decision-making,
such as drugs' potential health effects. 189 The inherent nature of
confidential settlements prevents insight into their content. Only when
plaintiffs' attorneys buck the trend and refuse to agree to confidentiality
are the contents discoverable. For example, several private lawyers in
the tobacco litigation who represented the State of Minnesota refused to
settle on a basis that would have kept documents produced in discovery
out of the public eye.190 Even though the decision substantially reduced
their attorneys' fees, the attorneys agreed to settle only if the documents
were kept in a public repository. 191 As federal courts certify fewer class
actions and an increasing number end in aggregate settlements, the
public will have less opportunity for glimpses into an increasingly
opaque ex post regulatory process. This surely does little to placate
criticism that class aggregation is undemocratic.
undermined the foundational precepts of American democracy. It has done so by effectively
transforming the essence of the governing substantive law that the class action has been created to
enforce.").
187 E.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996) (providing an example of the alliance between private tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers
and Richard Daynard, a law professor and anti-tobacco activist who created the Tobacco Products
Liability Project); Peter J. Boyer, Big Guns, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 53, 54-67
(observing the alliance between the Legal Action Project, part of the Brady Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence, and private law firms in gun litigation); see also PRINGLE, supra note 37, at 6
(noting Daynard's role in the tobacco litigation).
188 Keeping discovery materials and the settlement terms confidential often prompts conflict
between individual and group interests. Erichson, supra note 115, at 560-61. Erichson notes that
"[i]n most of these situations, the multiple representation ought to be permitted with client
consent." Id
189 See Wagner, supra note 186, at 697-98 ("Without key information on the ways in which a
product might be risky-for example, scientific research revealing that tobacco is both addictive
and carcinogenic, asbestos is carcinogenic, or a birth control device breeds lethal bacteria-
regulators, the public at large, and other stakeholders cannot participate meaningfully on whether
or how to regulate products that cause harms.").
190 DEBORAH CAULFIELD RYBAK & DAVID PHELPS, SMOKED: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL 385 (1998); Erichson, supra note 37, at 2097-98.
191 RYBAK & PHELPS, supra note 190, at 385; Erichson, supra note 37, at 2097-98.
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2. Deterrence
This higher incidence of nonclass settlements caused by federal
courts' reluctance to certify nationwide classes may also affect the class
action's ability to deter corporate wrongdoing. 192 Measuring a class
action's deterrent effect is notoriously tricky and almost inherently
theoretical. For example, it is difficult to determine what, if any,
deterrent effect a latent injury class action would have on corporate
actors given that those actors may have left the company years before.
Nevertheless, one can at least theorize that if a class action is brought
against the same corporate actors within a relatively short time, its
behavioral influence might be two-fold. First, the ability to pool similar
claims through Rule 23(b)(3) creates a viable litigation threat that
corporate actors must consider in any cost-benefit analysis. 193
Presumably, this "threat effect" deters risky behaviors taken without
due care and results in safer products and better corporate practices. 94
Second, class actions decrease the need for future lawsuits by
developing the law (for example, of products liability or securities
fraud), which clarifies and delineates boundaries for socially acceptable
risks. 195 Class litigation can develop the law through traditional
means--decisional precedent-or it can prompt structural
transformation-legislative action.196 For an oversimplified example, if
a drug manufacturer can assess the ex ante costs of additional research
to create a safer product versus the costs of litigation, it will invest in
additional research if the threatened tort liability approximates or
exceeds prevention costs.
192 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 901 ("[A] claim's deterrence value is, in effect, a 'public
good' that the private claims market fails to maximize because plaintiff attorneys gain nothing
from its production.") (footnote omitted); see also RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 316-24 (2d. ed. 1978) (applying the concept of public good
to mass exposure litigation).
193 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 900 ("Besides squandering the system's resources, the
duplicative adjudication of common questions generally places mass exposure claims at a
competitive disadvantage in the claims market and deprives the system of their deterrence value.
But the courts' traditional passive role inhibits resort to interventionist methods that might reduce
litigation costs, enable the claims market to reflect the relative deterrence values of competing
mass exposure and sporadic accident claims, and inform potential claimants of their rights to sue
or to join pending litigation.").
194 See Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 723; Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 573-74.
195 See Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 723.
196 Owen Fiss, who coined the term "structural transformation," argues that transformation
through litigation identifies a set of values that "stand as the core of a public morality and serve as
the substantive foundations of structural litigation." Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political
Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 121, 124 (1982). He continues, "[t]he
social function of contemporary litigation is not to resolve disputes, but rather to give concrete
meaning to that morality within the contact of the bureaucratic state." ld.
2550 [Vol. 29:6
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Assuming that class actions can deter wrongdoing, CAFA may
cause sub-optimal deterrence in three respects. First, the higher incident
of nonclass settlements may allow defendants to avoid internalizing the
full costs of their tortious conduct. Second, because CAFA has a
splintering effect on certification that creates more private collective
settlements, there will be less opportunity for legal opinions to clarify
the law, for open debates to prompt structural transformation, and for
the law to perform its guiding function. This, in turn, creates
uncertainty about which behaviors will result in a penalty. Finally, on a
related note, the choice-of-law quagmire adds further unpredictability
for actors who strive to behave within legal boundaries.
The first critique, that nonclass settlements may permit defendants
to shoulder less than the full costs of their conduct, takes two points for
granted. First, class actions and collective actions deter wrongdoing by
threatening potential tortfeasors (such as corporate officers and
directors) with liability for the full costs of their tortious behavior. 197
Second, optimal deterrence enhances public welfare by preventing
unreasonable risk that costs more to incur than to prevent.' 98 Without
certification, it is likely that at least some plaintiffs attorneys will
decide that investing in collective actions is too risky. Thus, fewer suits
may diffuse the threat effect needed for optimal deterrence. 199 Put
differently, in raising the incidence of non-certified class actions that
become aggregate settlements, CAFA has weakened the class action's
deterrent effect. 200 This is particularly troublesome given the American
system's heavy reliance on litigation as ex post regulation.
Second, because litigation helps ensure that behaviors conform to
public values, settlements erode opportunities to give force to and
interpret those values. 20 1 On litigation's function, Owen Fiss observes,
"Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state power to
bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. '202 Also, if class
actions and quasi class actions perform a semi-public regulatory
function,203 then the higher incident of private settlements dilutes this
197 See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort
Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1880 (2002); cf Rosenberg, supra note 33, at
903-04.
198 Rosenberg, supra note 197, at 1880.
199 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 906-07 ("Only if enough of the actual victims prosecute
claims for compensation will the responsible institution be confronted with a threat of liability
powerful enough to deter it from committing future illegalities.").
200 For a defense to some of the common arguments against the use of class actions as a
deterrent, see Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 573-79.
201 See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
202 Id. at 1089.
203 See generally Fiss, supra note 27, at 23 ("[T]he idea of the private attorney general has
emerged. The power of initiation is vested in the individual citizen, but the function of the suit is
the same as one brought by the attorney general, namely, to vindicate the public interest.").
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function in two ways. First, it hampers judicial construction of laws
implementing these public values. This inhibits the law's guiding
function and creates more ambiguity about compliance. Second, private
confidential settlements withhold information from the public. 204 This
makes public reactions and marketplace justice-be it outrage over an
"unfair" outcome for a beloved company or boycotting products
considered potentially dangerous-impossible. 20 5 Overall, semi-public
lawsuits escape public accountability and restrict opportunities for law
to structure behavior.
Finally, CAFA's removal provision affects deterrence by trapping
more putative class actions within the federal choice-of-law quagmire.
By explicitly preserving Erie, CAFA maintains that a federal court is
bound to follow state court choice-of-law decisions even if those
decisions apply a uniform law to facilitate class certification. CAFA
objects to facilitating certification in this manner. 206 This creates
uncertainty about governing law, which leads to suboptimal deterrence.
When state laws vary, which one should a corporation follow? Put
differently, knowing that a certain body of substantive law will apply to
any given case-in state or federal court-permits actors to comply
with the law.20 7 Thus, predictable choice-of-law rules facilitate legal
compliance and help insulate against unfavorable litigation verdicts.208
A study conducted by John Calfee and Richard Craswell revealed
that the effects of uncertainty-such as uncertainty about which law
will govern-can "cause even risk-neutral defendants to over- or
undercomply. ' 209 Over-compliance can lead to increased consumer
costs, wasted resources, and denying goods to the economically
disadvantaged. 210 Moreover, if corporate actors could face penalties
204 Secret settlements resulted in public controversy in the 1990s after a Washington Post
series alleged that they played a major role in hiding health and safety information. See Elsa
Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 23-26, 1988, at Al.
Even in just the late 1980s, protective orders covered cases concerning breast implants, Ford's
pick-up trucks, Halcion sleeping pills, and heart valves. See Sen. Bill Lockyer, Calif. State Sen.
Sunshine in the Courts- The Need to Limit Secrecy Agreements that Hide Information on
Hazards, 20 Product Safety & Liability Rep. (BNA) No. 47, pt. II, at 40, 43 (Nov. 27, 1992).
205 See generally BAYLES, supra note 103, at 42 ("Public rules and principles allow people to
plan their activities to conform to them, and this reason applies whether the rules impose burdens
or confer benefits."); Cassese, supra note 175, at A17 (noting that protestors called for a boycott
of Wal-Mart until it ended its discriminatory practices). Bayles recounts a story of a female
shoplifter who received a harsher sentence than usual. After the newspaper ran the story, public
outrage prevented a continued crack down on other shoplifters. BAYLES, supra note 103, at 42-
43.
206 See supra note 73-79 and accompanying text.
207 See Issacharoff, supra note 79, at 1839-40.
208 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions,
66 MD. L. REV. 348,382 (2007).
209 John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974 (1984).
210 David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't,
[Vol. 29:62552
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regardless of their decisions, then they might ignore potential penalties,
throw up their hands, and engage in wealth-maximizing behavior in the
marketplace. 21' In short, not knowing which law might ultimately
govern may lead to sub-optimal deterrence. At least theoretically then,
CAFA weakened litigation's threat effects, diluted the law's guiding
function, and muddied questions about governing law.
3. Decree Effects, Collaboration, Precedent, and Preclusion
Despite weakening deterrence and reducing transparency, CAFA
does not entirely emasculate the class action's ex post regulatory
function. Because class actions provide incentives to overcome the
collective action dilemma and initiate litigation, the public gains some
value through aggregate settlements' positive externalities. This is
particularly true where the settlement involves declaratory or injunctive
relief requiring the defendant to change its policies.212 Absent a formal
policy change, the threat of collective lawsuits by the same plaintiffs'
attorney, or attorneys sharing information, may prompt a defendant to
make informal adjustments. 213 The effects spillover to the public.
Without a confidentiality provision, it is also possible that
collaborative information sharing about settlement terms could
advantage other litigants. Most often, particularly in mass tort cases,
defendants pattern collective settlements on other settlements. This
establishes guidelines for allocating funds based on criterion such as
injury. 214 Knowing patterns could prompt favorable settlements on
other litigants' behalf and, conversely, ward off non-compensable
cases. 215 Plaintiff information sharing thus creates symmetry in
settlement negotiations since repeat player defendants typically know
more about previous settlements, expert evidence, and discovery
materials. 216
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 403 (2000).
211 Cf A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 959 (1999) ("The settlement
dynamic in securities class actions fatally undermines the deterrent value of such suits. The cost
of litigating securities class actions, tied to potentially enormous judgments, ensures that even
weak cases will produce a settlement if they are not dismissed before trial.").
212 Rubenstein labels these effects the "decree effects" and notes that "[t]he legal principle
developed in the case will create more certainty in structuring social behavior and lower the need
for future adjudication concerning the decided issue." Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 723.
213 See id. at 724 ("Even if a defendant does not agree as a formal matter to change its general
policy as a consequence of the initial case, it may nonetheless do so informally lest it be faced
with repeated lawsuits.").
214 Eg., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); see
Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 582.
215 Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 724.
216 See Mark C. Weidmaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69,
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Even with plaintiff collaboration, these collective settlements may
allow defendants to shoulder less than the full costs of their actions.
Defendants' repeat player status (especially as to the same claims)
allows them to exploit the aggregate litigation process. Put differently,
once defense attorneys have prepared one claim for litigation, they will
be substantially prepared to defend all similar claims. 217 Whereas post-
CAFA process disaggregates plaintiffs' attorneys-at least as contrasted
with the certified class action process-it does not disaggregate
defendants. Defendants might, therefore, capitalize on transaction cost
efficiencies and aggregate settlements to pay less.218 Yet, without class
treatment, collective actions stand a marginally higher chance of ending
on the merits-through trial or summary judgment. 219 These actions
might further beneficial ex post regulation by developing legal
principles, precedent, and preclusion. Settled law prevents the need for
future litigation. 220
Preclusion stands out among these benefits. 22' Federalizing class
actions causes federal courts to retain non-certified actions and apply
the broad federal preclusion doctrines. Statistics indicate that after a
court denies class certification, it dismisses only 4% of cases for lack of
jurisdiction. 222 These once putative class actions thus remain in federal
court. And, on the off chance that they proceed to judgment on the
merits (as roughly 18% do), 22 3 they are subject to the more stringent
72 (2007) ("If a dispute occurs, the repeat player may seek to generate a favorable precedent or,
conversely, to suppress rule changes that might benefit future adversaries. To that end, a repeat-
player defendant might settle weak cases and litigate only those it expects to win. If it does
litigate, the defendant may make substantial investments in its defense for a number of
reasons.... The result is that, in many cases, repeat players will rationally make litigation
investments that no individual litigant can hope to match."); Rosenberg, supra note 210, at 400-
02.
217 Weidmaier, supra note 216, at 71-72; Rosenberg, supra note 210, at 399-402; Rosenberg,
supra note 33, at 902-03 ("Defendants that are repeatedly sued by individual plaintiffs gain the
upper hand in settlement negotiations because of their greater information about previous
settlements (the terms of which the parties may not have disclosed) and about discovery materials
from previous cases (some of which the parties may never have made public).").
218 See Weidmaier, supra note 216, at 71-72; Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 907.
219 See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 43, at 638 (reporting that five percent of cases went
to trial after the court denied certification whereas most certified class actions ended in
settlement).
220 See Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 726 ("The lawsuit might develop legal principles, change
industry practices, or conserve judicial and social resources .... The externality story is one about
how to secure the deterrent effects of litigation. But the externality story can be read even more
broadly in that the externalities ... exceed simple deterrence."); Luban, supra note 7, at 2626
("[L]egal rules and precedents are valuable not only as a source of certainty, but also as a
reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public values.") (footnotes omitted).
221 For a thorough and informative treatment of preclusion in class litigation, see Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005).
222 Willging & Wheatman, supra note 43, at 636. Note that this statistic includes data on both
state and federal court decisions.
223 Id. (indicating that after courts deny certification they enter summary judgment thirteen
percent of the time and try cases five percent of the time).
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federal preclusion doctrines allowing non-mutual offensive use of
collateral estoppel. 224
This means that if a defendant faced with a cadre of splintered
actions loses on the merits-through summary judgment, consent
decrees, or trial---other plaintiffs could "borrow" that finding. They
thus save judicial and litigant resources by not having to re-litigate the
same issue or decision. 225 Thus, if a plaintiff's attorney can budget
costs for winning one case on the merits, other cases and attorneys can
potentially free ride on those efforts. Even attorneys litigating against
defendants who were not in privity with defendants in the initial action
may benefit from the decision's stare decisis effect.
In sum, CAFA significantly effects class litigation's regulatory
function. It may decrease transparency within the judicial process on
controversial public matters. And it can weaken deterrence by diluting
litigation's threat effects and creating uncertainty about governing law.
CONCLUSION
It is true that CAFA affects class action practice in ways that
extend far beyond a venue change. Still, my intent in this Article is not
to idealize pre-CAFA practice. Rather, given the cyclical nature of
class action reform and retrenchment, I hope to add to the dialogue in
this continuing debate. Identifying class litigation's often ignored
224 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
225 See Chamblee [Burch], supra note 92, at 175 ("Due to the high stakes of the first trial for
the defendant, the initial plaintiffs can exert more pressure on the defendant to settle.").
Economists William Landes and Richard Posner have argued that adjudication produces a private
good in that our court system produces rules and precedents that benefit future litigants. William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 237
(1979); see also Luban, supra note 7, at 2622-23. Even if the federal court remands cases to state
court, any state court ruling on the merits-of individual or collective actions-carries a
preclusive effect under the Full Faith and Credit Doctrine. The Full Faith and Credit Doctrine in
the Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The
United States Code echoes this doctrine and states:
[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such state, Territory, or
Possession of the United States ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such state, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). To be sure, full faith and credit issues often prove problematic for
courts. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (permitting
preclusive effect of a settlement embodied in a state consent decree that purported to settle a
securities claim that was within the exclusive purview of the federal courts); Migra v. Warren
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (finding that the preclusive effects of state-court
judgments applied in federal court); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
(according collateral estoppel to a Title VII employment discrimination claim); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (applying collateral estoppel to a civil rights claim).
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positive externalities and analyzing CAFA's impact on these benefits is
truly just a beginning. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some
preliminary observations about the effect of federalizing class actions.
Perhaps the most important effect from a consequentialist standpoint is
that CAFA may weaken deterrence and inhibit litigation's use as ex post
regulation. Equally important, from an ethicist's and proceduralist's
perspective, is CAFA's impact on procedural justice and the ex post
regulatory process. It causes, at times, increased bureaucracy,
inadequate representation, decreased access to courts, and systemic
illegitimacy. Of course, each criticism is, at other times, tempered by
greater access to process and lower cost. Finally, from a public benefit
perspective, CAFA may decrease systemic transparency, but may
bolster the incidence of preclusion and thereby enable free riders.
CAFA's legislative history provided half of the picture. It is only
through realizing that class actions can perform a public good-ex post
regulation-with positive spillovers that the full picture of Rule 23
emerges. And that was, perhaps, CAFA's dirty little secret.
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